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CASENOTE
WHAT ACTIONS CAUSE ONE TO BE A GENERATOR IN ORDER TO BE EXEMPTED
FROM THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT?
United States v. Sims Bros. Constr., Inc.'
I. Introduction
Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") because it
recognized the fact that hazardous waste and solid waste disposal "without careful planning and
management can present a danger to human health and the environment." 2 Under the RCRA,
criminal charges can be brought against any person who "knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any
hazardous waste... without a permit." 3 The Environmental Protection Agency, however, has created
-4
ways to get around the permit process in certain situations through its regulations. If a person meets
the particular requirements of these regulations, the person is exempt from the permit requirement
and has an affirmative defense to charges brought under the RCRA.'
U.S. v. Sims Bros. Constr., Inc. addressed the question of what actions are sufficient to
qualify one as a "generator" under the regulations, and whether the defendant's actions in this case
met that threshold.6 If the defendants acts qualified them as "generators," then they could have
argued that they were entitled to the permit exemption. However, the Fifth Circuit found that the
defendants were not in fact the generators of the hazardous waste in question.8
11. Facts and Holding
The defendants in US. v. Sims Bros. Constr., Inc. appealed from a decision by the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.9 The defendants, Sims Brothers
Construction. Inc. ("Sims"). Robert Case ("Case"), Mark Jerkins ("Jerkins"), and Amtek of
Louisiana. Inc. ("Amtek-) (collectively "defendants") appealed their conviction for illegal storage of
hazardous waste in violation of the RCRA' 0 to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.'1
In early 1997, Sims contracted to be the general contractor for Albertson's Inc.
(-Albertson's-) in the building of a supermarket.12 Albertson's is a corporation that owns and
operates grocery stores throughout the United States.13 Albertson's newest project in 1997 was to
277 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2001).
42 U.S.C. § 690 1(b)(2) (2001).
42 U.S.C. § 6928 (d)(2)(A) (2001).
40 C.F.R. §§ 262 34. 261.5 (2001).




q Id. at 736.
'0 42 U.S.C. § 6928(dX2)(A)-
" Sims. 277 F.3d at 736-737.
1 Id at 737.
" Id.
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build a supermarket in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on recently purchased property.14 As general
contractor, Sims subcontracted with Amtek to do the demolition and site preparation work.is
After work had commenced, it was discovered on May 20, 1997 that one of the buildings
scheduled for demolition contained two yellow canisters designed to hold pressurized gases.' 6 Both
containers bore a skull and crossbones, the words "poison" and "Property of Reddick Fumigants,"
and testing showed that one or both of them contained hazardous waste.' 7 It was later determined
that they contained liquefied methyl bromide.'8
An employee who immediately notified Case, the president of Amtek, and Jerkins, who was
hired by Sims to be the superintendent of the project, discovered the canisters in the building., 9 The
canisters were moved from the building to an open on-site area where they remained until around
June 13, 1997.20
Upon removal of the canisters from the building, Jerkins saw a poison label and Case saw the
fumigant stamp, but they were unaware of the exact contents until they tested them. 2' Despite
conversations discussing the proper removal of the containers by an environmental company, no
further effort was ever made by the defendants to remove the containers. 22 At no time .was
Albertson's. law enforcement. an environmental agency, or any commercial or industrial entity
contacted about the presence of the containers. 23 Both Case and Jerkins knew that Albertson's had
had an environmental site assessment that did not reveal the presence of the containers. 24
Around June 13. 1997. an Amtek employee removed the containers without the defendants'
consent or knowledge, and gave them to his cousin Edith Rome who later connected the containers
to her propane stove. The canisters leaked methyl bromide causing Ms. Rome and her son initially
to become ill, but Ms. Rome later died as a result of methyl bromide poisoning.26
An-investigation ensued that revealed the history of the canisters. The canisters had
originally been filled by Reddick Fumigants, Inc., and were bought in October of 1977 by W.L.
Albritton Farms, which operated the property as a peach and vegetable farm. 27 Later apartments
were built on the property. Ms. Hallie Box had been the manager of the apartments and claimed
that the particular building where the containers were found was used for storage, and that she was
unaware of their presence. She explained that if she had known about the containers she would
have had them removed by an environmental company.30 In May and June of 1997 Reddick
Fumi gants was still operating and would have accepted the return of the containers.3 1
h/.
*h/.
h. "Ieth1 I bromide products and their deri ati \es are used primaril1 as agricultural furnigants. As an ozone-depleting chemical,
under the Clean Air Act and the Montreal Protocol. use of methIl bromide is being phased out." In re Bromine Antitrust Litigation,
20)3 F.R.D. 413. 405 (S.D. Ind. 2001_ For more information on methyl bromide and the phasing out of methyl bromide see
http: will.cpa.eol docs o/one mbr mbioa html> (accessed April 16. 2002).
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On February 9, 1999, a grand jury in the Middle District of Louisiana indicted the
defendants, charging them with illegal storage of hazardous waste in violation of RCRA. Title 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A). 32 The defendants filed several motions to dismiss, but when the motions
were denied by the district court the defendants accepted a plea agreement, while reserving their
right to appeal the decision to deny their motions to dismiss and whether the stipulated facts
supported the defendants' guilty pleas.33 The defendants had argued at their plea agreement hearing
that the stipulated facts were insufficient to support a guilty plea, but the district court found that the
facts were sufficient and accepted the guilty pleas.3 On December 1, 2000. the defendants were
sentenced and the judgments were entered on December 7, 2000,' upon which the defendants filed
timely notice of appeal to the Fifth Circuit.3 6
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the Resource Conservation and Recovely Act3
Congress enacted the RCRA because it recognized the fact that hazardous waste and solid
waste disposal "without careful planning and management can present a danger to human health and
the environment."3  Under the RCRA, criminal charges can be brought against any person who
"knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste...-without a permit." An exception is
granted to "small quantity generators" ("SQGs") 0 and -conditionally exempt small quantity
generators" ("CESQGs").4'
SQGs are generators of hazardous waste that generate between 100 kilograms and 1000
kilograms of hazardous waste in one calendar month, and they are allowed to store the waste on-site
for up to 180 days without a permit so long as they meet certain requirements.4 2 CESQGs are those
generators that generate 100 kilograms or less of hazardous waste in a calendar month and thus, are
not subject to regulation.43 If one is found to be a generator, they must not only meet the quantity




3s Sims was sentenced to five years probation, a fine ofSOO,000, and a special assessment ofS400. Amtek was sentenced to the
years probation and a special assessment of S400. Jerkins was sentenced to fie years probation and a special assessment of S100. and
Case was sentenced to five years probation, restitution of S14,628. a fine of SIO,000, and a special assessment of S100. Id. at 738. n 2.
36 Sins, 277 F.3d at 738.
" 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.
3 42 U.S.C. § 690 1(b)(2).
'942 U.S.C. § 6928(dX2)(A).
4 40 C.F.R. § 262.34(d).
4i 40 C.F.R. at 261.5.
o 40 C.F.R. at 262.34(d).
4 40 C.F.R. § 261.5(a)-(b). In the present case, the methyl bromide in the two containers was less than 100 kg together, the total
hazardous waste on the site was less than 1000kg, and there was less than 100kg on average per calendar month for the calendar year
Sims. 277 F.3d at 737.
44 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.5(f)-(g), (j), 262.34(d)(1)-(5).
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B. Due Process Requirements
The defendants in US. v. Sims Bros. Constr., Inc. argued that they were denied due process
because of unconstitutionally vague language and lack of fair warning as to how pertinent statutes
and federal regulations would be interpreted.
The defendants had argued that they fell within the exception to the RCRA because they
were CESQGs.4 6 A generator is defined as "any person, by site, whose act or process produced
hazardous waste identified or listed, or whose act first causes hazardous waste to become subject to
regulation." 4 7 The defendants contended that since they could not have known that they would not
be considered generators because their actions did not first cause the methyl bromide to become
subject to regulations, they lacked knowledge of the facts that rendered their conduct criminal.
Thus, the defendants were arguing that they lacked fair warning as to how the regulation's definition
of generator would be applied to them.
The defendants also argued that the definition of "storage" is unconstitutionally vague
because it fails to define how one goes about storing gaseous materials since gas is contained from49 
-0SOou aerastinception. Under the RCRA, hazardous waste must be solid waste,o and for gaseous materials to
be considered solid waste, it must be contained.5 1 "Storage" is defined as "the containment of
hazardous waste, either on a temporary basis or for a period of years, in such a manner as not to
constitute disposal of such hazardous waste."52 The defendants argued that the RCRA's definition
of storing gas gave them no fair warning that "merely finding the cylinders on a jobsite or placing
them on the ground without further containment constituted a felony."- They argued that vagueness
and lack of fair warning violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights. 4
First, the United States Supreme Court has held that unless the challenge of vagueness
involves a First Amendment right, the challenge "must be examined in the light of the facts of the
case at hand."55 In interpreting a statute for vagueness, the Supreme Court has said that "[ojne to
whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness. - Thus, if
the facts of the case and the defendant's conduct clearly fall within the statute then it is not vague
even if it could be interpreted as vague under a different set of facts; in other words, it must be
demonstrated to be "impermissibly vague in all of its applications."
The fair warning requirement of the Due Process Clause provides that "no man shall be held
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.-"'
One way the fair warning requirement is violated is when a statute is so vague that "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.'' The warning
requirement is also violated when "although clarity at the requisite level may be supplied by judicial
0 Sims, 277 F.3d at 740.
46 Id. at 739.
47 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (2001).
s Sims, 277 F.3d at 740.
49Id.
'42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (2001).
" 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27).
52 id.
5 Sims, 277 F.3d at 740.
s Id. at 739.
US. v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975).
5' Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974).
7 Village of Hoffnian Estates v. Flipside Hoffman Estates, Inc.. 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1981).
8 Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964) (quoting US. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
9 US. v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926))
23
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gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute, due process bars courts from applying a novel construction
of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly
disclosed to be within scope.",60 The Supreme Court -has held that in order to show no fair warning,
the judicial construction must have been unforeseeable in the way it would be applied.6'
The defendants argued that they had no fair warning that they could have known the facts
that would cause them not to be considered a generator. "To act 'knowingly' is to act with
'knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense' but not necessarily with knowledge that the facts
amount to illegal conduct, unless the statute indicates otherwise." 62 The question in the instant
decision becomes whether the defendants' lack of knowledge means that they did not know all the
surrounding facts, or that they did not know and understand the law and regulations. If the latter is
true, then the defendants have a mistake of law argument rather than a mistake of fact argument.
It is a well established principle that mistake of law or ignorance of law is not a defense to
criminal conduct.63 In U.S. v. Intl. Minerals & Chemical Corp. the sole question on appeal was
whether this principle applied to regulations as well as statutes. The United States Supreme Court
held that the principle is applicable to a "duly promulgated and published regulation."6 5 In this case,
the defendant had failed to comply with regulations set forth by the Interstate Commerce
Commission in its transportation of sulfuric acid and hydrofluosilicic acid.66 The Supreme Court
found that -where... dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are
involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of
them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation."67
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The defendants' motions to dismiss had alleged that (1) they were denied due process
because the statute was unconstitutionally vague or because the government had failed to show the
necessary mens rea requirement; (2) the indictment was defective; and (3) the district court lacked
jurisdiction because the government was trying to enforce state law.68 The defendants also appealed
on the issue of whether the facts stipulated to by the parties were sufficient to support their guilty
pleas.6 9
A. Due Process Analysis
The Fifth Circuit first looked at the defendants' four due process claims: (1) that there was no
notice or fair warning that they would not be considered "generators" for the small quantity
generators exemption that allows for on-site storage; (2) that they had no knowledge of the facts
supporting the denial of the on-site storage permit exception which rendered their conduct criminal;
(3) they had no notice that Chapter 21 of Louisiana's Hazardous Waste Regulations applied to them
Id. at 266.
larks v. US. 430 U.S. IS8. 192 (1977).
L' S. v Fuller, 162 F.3d 256. 260 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Bryan v. U.S., 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998)).




67 Id. at 565.
s Sints. 277 F 3d at 739-741
Id. at 742
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since the state legislature had repealed the law; and (4) that the definition of "storage" is
70unconstitutionally vague.
Of these issues, the Fifth Circuit first addressed the issue of whether the defendants were
.generators." Under Federal regulations there is an exemption for small quantity generators of
hazardous waste that allows for producers of less than an average of 1000kg of hazardous waste per
month to be exempt from 42 U.S.C. § 6928.71 Furthermore those that produce no more than 100kg
of hazardous waste are considered "conditionally exempt small quantity generators," and the permit
requirements for them are less stringent. 72 The defendants argued that they were small quantity
generators because the methyl bromide in the containers weighed less than 100kg, and the total
hazardous waste on the site was less than 1000kg in any one calendar month and less than an
average of 100kg per calendar month for the calendar year. The district court and Fifth Circuit
found that the definition of -'generator" is "any person, by site, whose act or process produces
hazardous waste identified or listed, or whose act first causes hazardous waste to become subject to
regulation." 7 - The Fifth Circuit found that because the containers were already waste at the time
Albertson's bought the property. neither Albertson's nor the defendants could be considered the
producer of the waste or the person '-whose act first causes hazardous waste to become subject to
regulation.
The second due process issue was whether the defendants lacked knowledge of facts that
would have rendered their otherwise lawful conduct criminal.' The defendants contended that they
could not have known that they would not be considered "generators" and thus exempt under the
small generators exemption. The Fifth Circuit found that this argument failed because even if they
had been considered generators, they had failed to meet federal regulations for the storage of
hazardous waste.
The next due process issue addressed by the court was whether the word "storage" was
unconstitutionally vagie. Storage is defined by 42 U.S.C. § 6903(33) to be the "containment of
hazardous waste, either on a temporary basis or for a period of years, in such a manner as not to
constitute disposal of such hazardous waste."" Also for waste to be hazardous, it must be "solid
waste.- and for gaseous material to be -solid waste" it must be ",contained."80 The defendants
contended that this is vague because by its nature gaseous material is contained from inception.8 1
The Court found that the defendants' argument that storage involved putting the containers
inside an additional container rather than putting them out in the open was invalid.82 The Court
found that allowing these containers to sit out in the open for three weeks without making any effort
to pro' ide for their proper removal was in fact storage and subject to 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A).
Id. at 739.
4o C F R. 260.10.
40 CF R. § 261.5(a)
ims. 277 F.3d at 737-35.
Id. at 739 (quoting 40 CF. R § 260. 10: 1 AC 33V 109 997).




42 1'.S.C §§ 690305).(27y
Sims. 277 F.3d at 740.
Id at 74 1.
h'id.
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B. Deficiency of the Indictment
The defendants argued that the indictment was deficient because the government failed to
show in the indictment that the defendants were not entitled to the exemptions allowed for in the
statute.84 The Court found this argument invalid because the permit exemption is an affirmative
defense rather than an element of the crime to be proven by the government.
C. Jurisdiction of the District Court
The defendants' next argument was that the government was attempting to enforce state
regulations against them, and thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction."' The Fifth Circuit found
that this argument was invalid because the state regulations applied to small quantity generators and
the defendants had already been found not to be generators. 8 7
D. Sufficiency of the Stipulated Factual Basis
Finally the defendants argued that the stipulated facts of the case did not support their guilty
pleas and that the district court should not have accepted them as having supported the pleas.'' The
Fifth Circuit first noted that the standard of review for insufficiency of the evidence is the clearly
erroneous standard, and then went on to review the evidence in support of the district court's
decision.8 9 The Fifth Circuit found that methyl bromide is a hazardous waste once discarded, and
the canisters had been intentionally abandoned or discarded, thus making them waste."0 The court
also found that the defendants had the necessary knowledge that the containers were in fact waste
and had been discarded because the defendants had discussed the removal of the canisters
themselves.9 '
Thus the Fifth Circuit found none of the defendants* due process arguments to be persuasiVe
and that there was sufficient evidence to support their guilty pleas. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the defendant's guilty pleas and convictions.
V. COMMENT
One of the issues the Fifth Circuit had to deal with in U.S. v. Sims Bros. Constr. wasx whether
the defendants were generators.92 If they were generators, then they might have been able to qualify
for the small quantity or conditionally exempt small quantity generators exceptions to the RCRA. .
First, the defendants argued that they should be considered generators under the definition.
A generator is defined as "any person, by site, whose act or process produces hazardous waste








9 Id at 739.
9 Id.
9 40 C.F.R. § 260.10.
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They argued that because they did not know the history of the canisters containing the methyl
bromide, as far as they knew, they were the first to decide to dispose of the canisters. Thus, they
would be generators in the sense that they would have been the ones to first consider the canisters
waste causing them to become subject to regulation.9 6
The court correctly did not accept this argument. The canisters had been on the property,
which had had two different prior owners, for twenty years.97 It seems clear that the canisters had
been abandoned well before Albertson's bought the property. So whoever actually abandoned them
would be the one to qualify as a generator because that would be the person who originally caused
them to become subject to regulation.
Furthermore, even if the defendants could be considered the generators of this hazardous
waste, they would not qualify for any of the small quantity generator exceptions. Both the small
quantity generator exception and the -conditionally exempt small quantity generator exception list
several requirements that must be fulfilled for the exceptions to apply to the generator. ' For
example, "at all times there must be at least one employee either on the premises or on call with the
responsibility for coordinating all emergency response measures...[and] this employee is the
emergency coordinator." 99 Although the facts of the case do not specifically say whether the
defendants established someone to act as an emergency coordinator for their hazardous waste, the
court found that the defendants could not meet the conditions for the exceptions. 00
Second, the defendants argued that they lacked knowledge of the facts that rendered their -
actions criminal. ot The problem with this argument is that when one argues the defense of mistake
of facts, it is because there is a fact outside of their knowledge. "To act 'knowingly' is to act xith
'knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense' but not necessarily with knowledge that the facts
amount to illegal conduct, unless the statute indicates otherwise." 02
The facts that constitute this particular crime are that the person knowingly stored hazardous
waste without a permit.1o3 The facts that the defendants stipulated to clearly show that they were
aware that the contents of the canisters were hazardous, that they knowingly stored the canisters on
their property, and that they did not have a permit to store such hazardous materials.o-0 In order to
meet the small quantity generator exceptions, one would have to show that he was in fact a generator
and that he had met the qualifying conditions specified in the regulations.10 5 The defendants were
aware of the facts that would keep them from qualifying under these exceptions in that they
definitely did not take measures to meet the safety conditions in the regulations, and that a reading of
the definition of "generator" clearly showed that their actions did not fall within the definition.
Thus, the defendants did know the facts, but it is not necessary to show that they knew that this set of
facts constituted illegal behavior.
It seems that the defendants' real argument was that they were unaware of how the definition
of "generator" would be applied and that it would be given a narrow construction. This would be a
mistake of law and fair warning argument. The defendants were arguing that they had no fair
9 Sims, 277 F.3d at 740.
9 Id
9 Id. at 738-38.
9 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.5(f)-(g),(), 262.34(d)(1)-(5).
9 40 C.F.R. §262.34(d)(5)(i).
1" Sins, 277 F.3d at 740.
101 Id.
102 Fler, 162 F.3d at 260 (quoting Bryan v. US., 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998)).103 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A).
' Sims, 277 F.3d at 737.
'0' 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.5(f)-(g),(j), 262.34(d)(1)-(5).
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warning of how their conduct would be treated under the regulations. This argument cannot hold up
either.
The fair warning requirement says that "although clarity at the requisite level may be
supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute. .. due process bars courts from
applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior
judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within scope."' 06 There is absolutely nothing "novel"
about the court's interpretation of "generator." The Fifth Circuit clearly applied the definition of
generator as it was meant to be applied. They did not alter the definition or give it some narrower or
broader meaning. They just applied it as it was written.
Thus the Fifth Circuit was correct in finding that the small quantity generator exceptions did
not apply to the defendants. The defendants did not fall within the definition of generator. Even if
they had, they did not meet the other qualifying conditions of the regulations. Finally, they were
aware of all the necessary surrounding facts that rendered their actions criminal.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the defendants" arguments that the small generator exceptions should have been
applied to their actions, the fact of the matter is that their actions clearly fell outside of the plain
meaning of the regulations' texts. The Fifth Circuit's decision was based on interpreting what was
seemingly an obvious and unambiguous definition of "generator."
LEECIA D. CARNES
28
Lanier. 520 U S. at 266.
